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Abstract 
Despite the numerous researches about imperfect competition, the market power remains difficult to quantify using 
traditional economics methods. In this paper, we propose an experimental economics design and outline some ways of 
analysis of its results toward characterization of the use of market power. A simple system with two regions and a 
limited interconnection transfer capacity allocated by an implicit auction is studied. Depending on the experiments two 
or three subjects share equitably the production capacity in one region, while the production capacity is equitably 
shared among 5 subjects leading to a more competitive situation in the second one. In both regions, we observe a 
market price that is different from the theoretical results allowing a quantification of the use of market power. Results 
are also analyzed based on a characterization of the subjects’ behaviour. Further the impact of subjects’ behaviour on 
the market price evolution is described. 
1. Introduction 
The ongoing liberalisation process of electricity markets has caused an important evolution of the 
industry structures over the world. A major goal of the reforms was to achieve economic 
efficiency and low electricity prices by introducing competition in former regional electricity 
markets. As way of example, a trend toward development of transmission interconnection 
capacities in order to reach a higher degree of competition in regional electricity markets 
[Boucher-Smeers (2002)] has been observed in Europe. In this context, interconnection capacities 
play not only the physical role of connector between regional transmission systems but also the 
role of threatening competitors and therefore promoting competition.  
The electricity market integration requires well designed rules in order to allow efficiently scarce 
transmission capacities among economic agents. Two main methods have thus been applied in 
Europe to cope with limited interconnection capacities between countries: i) implicit auctions, 
where energy and transmission are priced together and ii) explicit auctions, where energy and 
transmission are priced separately [Ehrenman-Smeers (2005)]. These methods are efficient if the 
“perfect competition” assumption is respected. However, recent experience has shown that this 
prerequisite is usually not true.  
                                                 
1 F. Petit and M. Saguan are with GRJM research group at University of Paris XI.  
An up-dated version of this article will be available at the GRJM web site (www.grjm.net). 
2 The authors want to thank the "Conseil Régional d'Île de France" for their support and for funding the 
experimental facilities. 
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In fact the recent merging of generation utilities has reinforced the oligopolistic context 
remaining from former regional monopolies. Most of European regional electricity markets have 
thus reached a high level of market concentration with for instance monopoly in France, Belgium 
and Greece, duopoly in Spain, Finland, and Sweden or triopoly in United Kingdom [Glachant-
Finon (2005), Newbery (2005), von der Fehr et al. (2005), Crampes-Fabra (2005)]. There is a 
large consensus among economists to state that these types of oligopoly induce an important 
market power for its participants. This notion of market power could be defined as the ability to 
alter profitably prices away from competitive levels [Mas Collel et al. (1995)]. The high market 
concentration is thus a characteristic of imperfect competition and a serious threat for the 
economic efficiency of electricity markets. There has been an increasing research activity to study 
the interaction between market power in national electricity market, limited interconnection 
capacities and allocation methods. 
Numerous economic studies have already covered the theme of quantification of the use of 
market power in presence of transmission constraints. A traditional theoretical approach mainly 
based on Game Theory has been used to study imperfect competitive set up in electricity markets 
with transmission constraints [Cardell et al. (1997), Borenstein et al. (2000), Hobbs (2001), 
Ralph-Smeers (2006)]. According to most of game theory approaches, it is supposed that all 
market participants have perfect information and perfect rationality for computing the market 
(Nash) equilibrium and that they agree in playing it. However, there is still no satisfactory method 
for quantifying the exercise of market power in real systems, nor to evaluate the market power for 
any market designs. The main drawbacks of the theoretical approach are the lack of modelling 
bounded rationality and the lack of consideration of idiosyncrasies of market designs. A (fairly 
new) research method that solves these drawbacks is the experimental approach. 
Experimental economics shows some properties that are decisive for a better understanding of the 
use of market power in electricity market. The experimental technique, which allows taking into 
account human decision making in a complex situation, is described in [Smith (1994)]. As long as 
a set of conditions is respected, for instance if the experiment is simple enough for players to 
understand their impact and for economists to analyze results properly, experimental economics 
can provide useful information in seven cases listed by Smith; two reasons out of the seven 
justify the use of this method in this study, namely to compare environments and to establish 
empirical regularities as a basis for a new theory. 
In this paper an experimental approach is applied for measuring the exercise of market power in a 
simple system with two regions and a limited interconnection transfer capacity allocated by an 
implicit auction. Results from experiences are compared with theoretical results allowing a first 
quantification of the use of market power. Then, we propose a definition of some types of market 
behaviours, namely marginal-bidder, follower and leader, and we analyze the market price and its 
evolution depending on the behaviour of players. An accurate characterization of players’ 
behaviour is indeed necessary for developing adequate regulation of new electricity markets, 
which could also be evaluated through experimental economics.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design and the 
theoretical results that should be obtained according to classic game theory. Section 3 outlines the 
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experimental process. A complete overview of the results is then presented in section 4. Finally 
conclusions and propositions for further works are presented in section 5. 
2. Experimental design and assumptions 
In this section, we set the characteristics of the particular case that was studied and experimented. 
We start by defining the market structure, then we draw up the market design and theoretical 
results are finally presented. 
2.1 Market structure 
The market structure is presented in Figure 1. Producers and consumers are located within two 
zones, which are most often linked by an interconnection3. Subjects control only producers, while 
consumers’ actions are determined by a computer according to a predefined demand curve. 
 
Figure 1: Market Structure 
The available production is 150 MWh in each zone. This amount is equitably divided among 5 
producers in the 1st zone and 2 (experimental design A) or 3 (experimental design B) producers in 
the 2nd zone. Production costs depend on the zone. For each producer, half of his production has a 
low marginal cost (10 and 15 €/MWh in zone 1 and 2, respectively) and the other half has a high 
marginal cost (20 and 25 €/MWh in zone 1 and 2, respectively). All numerical details are 
provided in Table I. 
Zone Experimental design Unit type 
Marginal production 
cost (€/MWh) 
Available quantity 
(MWh) 
Low cost 10 15 
1 A and B 
High cost 20 15 
Low cost 15 38 
A 
High cost 25 37 
Low cost 15 25 
2 
B 
High cost 25 25 
Table 1: Numerical data beside producers 
Each experiment counts two or four phases; during which, the demand bids and the exchange 
capacity are maintained constant. These parameters are exposed in Table 2. 
Demand curve Experimental 
design reference 
Phase 
Duration (number 
of periods) Zone 1 Zone 2 
1 30 Base load 
A and B 
2 30 Peak load 
Table 2: Numerical data beside demands and interconnection 
                                                 
3 The way this interconnection is run is described in part 2.2: Market design. 
 
ZONE 1 
5 producers 
150 MWh 
ZONE 2 
2/3 producers 
150 MWh 
Maximum exchange: 30 MWh 
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Figure 2: Demand profiles 
The base case is experimental design A. It features a more competitive zone in which 5 producers 
own a production capacity of 30 MWh at a relatively low cost, and an oligopolistic zone in which 
only 2 producers can produce up to 75 MWh at a higher cost. Demand profiles are chosen in 
order to control the producers’ ability to use market power unilaterally or not; additionally, they 
are drawn so that the line be congested under competitive assumption in phase 2, but not in phase 
1. The ability to exercise market power is affected in the experimental design B by splitting of the 
2 producers in zone 2 into 3. 
2.2 Market design 
The interconnection capacity is allocated following the method known as implicit auction (or 
market coupling mechanism [ETSO-EuroPEX (2004)]). In this context, each zone has a local 
market, where only producers that are physically located in the same zone can bid through a 
uniform price sealed auction. 
Once offers have been submitted, aggregated bid and ask curves are computed on each market to 
calculate the two equilibrium prices PA and PB as represented in Figure 3 
 
Figure 3: Market clearing mechanism 
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When the price PB is higher than PA, a quantity ∆Q is exchanged from zone A toward zone B. 
This export is equivalent to an additional ask ∆Q at any price in market A while the 
corresponding import is equivalent to an additional bid ∆Q at any price in market B. This quantity 
∆Q is progressively raised from zero until one of the following cases is reached: 
- 1st case: no congestion: 
As we can see in figure 4, the quantity exchanged ∆Q = QA* - QA = QB* - QB is smaller than 
the Available Transfer Capacity of the interconnection A-B: there is thus only one price P* = 
PA* = PB* for both markets. 
 
Figure 4: Market clearing by non congested interconnection 
- 2nd case: congestion: 
As presented in figure 5, the quantity exchanged ∆Q = QA* - QA = QB* - QB is equal to the 
Available Transfer Capacity of the A-B interconnection: there is one price for each market and 
(PB* - PA*) x ATC is the congestion rent. 
 
Figure 5: Market clearing by congested interconnection 
In both cases, once equilibrium prices have been computed, bids submitted in market X are: 
- fully accepted when the offered price is below PX*; 
- fully rejected when the offered price is above PX*; 
- partially accepted when the offered price equals PX*. 
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2.3 Theoretical results 
Competitive and (static) Cournot equilibrium are computed for each experimental design and 
each phase following Hobbs (2001). Tables 3 and 4 show results corresponding to experimental 
designs A and B respectively. Given that the only difference between them is market structure 
(“concentration”) in zone 2, results corresponding to the perfect competition case are equivalent. 
In these cases the difference between phase 1 and 2 is the occurrence of congestion. In phase 1, 
both zones have the same price as there is no congestion. In phase 2, price in zone 2 is higher than 
price in zone 1; the interconnection is congested.  
In Cournot case, market structure is important and this can be seen comparing results from 
experimental design A and B4. Cournot prices of experimental design A corresponding to more 
concentrated market structure in zone 2 are higher than prices of experimental design B with a 
less concentrated market structure.  
 Phase 1 (no congestion) Phase 2 (congestion) 
 Price zone 1 Price zone 2 Price zone 1 Price zone 2 
Perfect competition 20,0 20,0 20,0 25,0 
Cournot 43,6 44,0 47,3 52,0 
Unilateral market power NP 25,0 25,0 NP 
Table 3: Price equilibrium for experimental design A 
 
 Phase 2 (no congestion) Phase 2 (congestion) 
 Price zone 1 Price zone 2 Price zone 1 Price zone 2 
Perfect Competition 20,0 20,0 20,0 25,0 
Cournot 40,8 40,8 47,3 50,0 
Unilateral market power NP 25,0 25,0 NP 
Table 4: Price equilibrium for experimental design B 
Moreover, the price obtained when only one player exerts his market power is determined; “NP” 
means that no producer has market power on this zone, namely that no player can unilaterally and 
profitably raise the market price above the competitive one. It can be noticed that in phase 2, any 
producer in zone 1 is pivotal (as long as the market price is below 60 €/MWh): under these 
circumstances, unilateral exercise of market power in zone 1 leads to a leveling of prices in both 
zones. 
 
3. Experimental process 
9 experiences were run with different settings and subjects from various origins, as shown in 
Table 5. 
 
 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that Cournot equilibrium computations have been done under the assumption that 
players do not try to “game” transmission pricing [Ralph-Smeers (2006)]. 
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Designation Experimental design Subjects origin 
Number of experiences 
led 
Number of period per 
experience 
A1, A2, A3 Students in engineering 3 60 
A4 
PhD students & faculty 
members (non-
economists) 
1 60 
A5 
PhD students 
(economists) 
1 60 
A6, A7 
A 
Students in engineering 2 40
5
 
B1 Students in engineering 1 60 
B2 
B PhD students & faculty 
members (non-
economists) 
1 60 
Table 5: Distribution of subject by experimental design and by origins 
 
3.1 The experimental economics laboratory 
All experiments were led in the laboratory for experimental economics in Supelec, provided with 
fifteen isolated computers so that no subject can communicate with each other. Subjects pass their 
offers and receive results through a web interface represented in Figure 6. All computations and 
data storage are performed on a server, allowing any numerical analysis of the results ex-post. 
 
Figure 6: Web interface for experiment subjects 
                                                 
5 Each phase lasts 20 periods but subjects had previously additional periods for training. 
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3.2 Instructions 
Every experience is foregone by thirty minutes of instructions; the market structure is described 
and the market design is detailed. Subjects are also taught how to use the interface. Two 
demonstration periods close the instruction phase in order to ensure that subjects are familiar with 
the interface. 
Subjects are given the phase parameters (demand curves and Available Transfer Capacities) and 
they are told when each phase begins. They know the total amount of production capacity 
available per zone (150 MWh) but they are not told others’ costs and capacities. 
3.3 Experimental progress 
The experiment itself lasts from one hour to one hour and a half depending on the number of 
periods to run. During first periods, subjects have 60 seconds to submit their bids; this term is 
progressively decreased while subjects are getting trained; however time is never binding during 
the experience. 
Subjects can submit and modify as many bids as many times as they want; nonetheless offered 
quantities and prices must be integers not only for computational purposes, but also to accelerate 
price convergence. In addition to information on the market structure, subjects have access to 
their last three periods’ profits, their aggregated profits, results for each previous period bids 
(fully accepted, partially accepted or rejected) and the price evolution on each market (zone 1 or 
2) from the beginning of the experience. There is no transaction cost and production costs are 
only due for sold units. 
4. First results 
4.1 Comparison of results with theory 
The market price obtained in each zone at the end of each phase is reported in the tables below; 
when no convergence was reached, the price is the average of the last 20 periods and is indicated 
by a *. 
 Phase 1 (no congestion) Phase 2 (congestion) 
 Price zone 1 Price zone 2 Price zone 1 Price zone 2 
Perfect competition 20,0 20,0 20,0 25,0 
Cournot 43,6 44,0 47,3 52,0 
Unilateral market power 20,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 
A1 21 24,2* 24,7* 26,1* 
A2 25,3* 25,6* 28,3* 28,9* 
A3 21 21 25 25 
A6 21 70 62* 80 
A7 21 21 23,8* 28,8* 
Table 6: Results for experimental design A 
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 Phase 1 (no congestion) Phase 2 (congestion) 
 Price zone 1 Price zone 2 Price zone 1 Price zone 2 
Perfect competition 20,0 20,0 20,0 25,0 
Cournot 40,8 40,8 47,3 50,0 
Unilateral market power 20,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 
B1 21 21 31,9* 36,2* 
B2 20,8* 20,9* 24,3* 25,6* 
Table 7: Results for experimental design B 
As it is explained in the following part, a market price of 21 instead of 20 €/MWh is still close to 
the competitive price. Thus, in the first phase, the market is often close to perfect competition; in 
the second phase, results are quite similar to the unilateral use of market power. In accordance 
with the results predicted in part 2.3, market prices in both zones stay rather close, particularly in 
phase 2. 
However, the market prices are far from (static) Cournot’s model expectations, and it is necessary 
to study individual behaviours in order to understand this divergence. 
4.2 A characterization of subjects’ behaviour 
In order to characterize subjects’ behaviour, we propose a classification based on offer functions. 
Experimental economics offer the possibility to observe the exercise of market power by 
comparing bids with production costs. As way of example, figure 8 represents the percentage of 
quantity offered over all periods and experiences for a given markup (equals to offered price 
minus production cost); all withdrawn units are represented as having a markup of 100 €/MWh. 
This figure tends to show a massive exercise of market power. 
Markup
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Figure 8: Price markup for all the experiences 
However, a more accurate study of the way subjects bid indicates that, since the price can never 
be below 20 €/MWh, the bids associated with the cheaper part of their production is not 
significant as far as subjects’ behaviour is concerned: the corresponding price can range from 
their production cost (10 or 15 €/MWh) to the competitive price (20 or 25 €/MWh) without any 
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particular reason nor any consequence on the market price. Thus, only the second half of their 
available units has been taken into account in figure 9. 
Since the offered price must be an integer, a markup equal to 1 is considered as a competitive 
behaviour linked to experimental design: the subject’s profits are similar if his bid is accepted at a 
price of 20 €/MWh or if it is rejected, it would be zero in both cases. As a consequence he may 
bid just above his marginal cost. Even under this condition, hardly half of the more expensive 
units are offered at a competitive price on zone 1, and less than a third on zone 2. 
Markup for the most expensive units
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Figure 9: Price markup by zone  
To build their offer functions, experiences show that subjects do not only refer to their marginal 
cost, but also to the previous period market price. Thus figure 10 represents the distribution 
function of the difference between the offered price and the previous market price, without taking 
into account competitive bids. 
Price difference for the more expensive units and non-competitive bids
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Figure 10: Difference between offered price and previous market price 
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This figure displays two different behaviours for bids which are not offered at their marginal cost. 
First, the price can be chosen above the previous market price, or even withdrawn as this is the 
case for almost half of the non-competitive bids on zone 2; this behaviour, and particularly 
capacity withdrawal, is an attempt to raise prices and is a feature of a price-marking, or leading, 
strategy. 
Second, half of the non-competitive bids on zone 1 is offered at the previous market price minus 
1 or 2 €/MWh. While the competitive behaviour is a price-taking strategy ensuring the player he 
will sell whenever it is profitable for him and the leader behaviour is a price-making strategy 
allowing the player to raise market price at a risk of not selling his power, this third one can be 
qualified as a follower behaviour: by bidding just below the previous price, the subject aims at 
preventing a price drop whilst limiting the risk for his offer to be rejected. This strategy is a clear 
incentive for a leader to raise the price punctually even if it is non-profitable in short term: the 
price decrease will be slow enough for him to earn more during the next periods than what he 
loses by exercising market power. Subjects can then reach an implicit collusion similar to the one 
observed in a repeated Stackelberg game, in which the follower plays functions of the leader’s 
previous period decision. An even stronger implicit collusion was observed during the experiment 
A6 in which the two producers of the second zone implicitly agreed to bid at the monopoly price. 
4.3 Impact of players’ behaviour on the market price and its evolution 
An experiment involving a leader and several followers results in prices significantly higher than 
the competitive price; moreover, price does not converge, but a dynamic equilibrium is found: 
price variation is a succession of peaks followed by slow decreases (over five to ten periods). 
In particular, when the interconnection is such that all the excess production in zone 1 can 
be exported into zone 2, congestion leads to a raise of the market price in zone 1 up to its 
level in zone 2. Simultaneously, as soon as the interconnection is congested, a lack of 
competition on zone 2 results in a price increase, from which a vicious circle may ensue. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Although the experimental design that is presented in this paper is extremely simple, it 
contributes to a better understanding of the use of market power. This analysis is supported by a 
classification of the subjects’ bids. Three main types of bids could indeed be clearly identified. 
This possible quantification of each type of bid is an interesting vector toward understanding the 
evolution of the market price. Future works are expected to depict more precisely the evolution of 
market price depending on the quantity of bids in each of the three classes. 
As its results are significantly different than those obtained using more classical theories, 
experimental economics could also be useful in order to evaluate the real efficiency of regulation 
designs. 
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